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NARST Discussion |
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In PER we now regularly see pre-post
effect sizes greater than 2 standard deviations (often not just a little
bit greater) and we see normalized gains of 60% to 90%. We're not just
talking statistical significance here, we are talking 98th-percentile
differences in PER. Nearly all of this work is in practices that can easily
be called "inquiry based" in which the emphasis, instead of
being merely and superficially "hands-on," is on engaging "minds"
in "elicit, compare, |
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Subject: RE: theory base and Piaget Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2002 15:04:57 -0500 From: "Richard J. Iuli" <riul@mail.rochester.edu> To: narst-l@narst.org I would like to toss in my two cents, as well. Having studied with Joe Novak I obviously have to add to the discussion the work of Ausubel, Novak and Gowin. Joe has always been, and continues to be, adamant that education research be theory-driven and education practice be grounded in empirical research. Perhaps the greatest failure of education over the course of the past 100 years has been the widespread neglect of this perspective in guiding research and practice. Like any robust theory, Ausubel's contemporary assimilation theory and Novak's meaningful learning theory explain much of what we observe in studying human learning. Obviously some of you will take exception to my claim, but this is not the forum to debate whose theory is "better." Rather my intent is to echo the comments of Anton Lawson, John Staver and Dewey Dykstra. We in the science education research community do have theories of learning that serve to guide science education research and practice. Furthermore, there are many fine science education researchers/ practitioners who operate from a theory-driven and, as Dewey stated, a "student understanding-driven," approach. The challenge to our science education research community is to hold one another accountable to these benchmarks of rigor. Perhaps the most critical step in this process is to make explicit the theory(ies) upon which our research and practice are built. Richard Iuli -- Richard J. Iuli, Ph.D. Department of Biology 477 Hutchison Hall University of Rochester Rochester, NY 14627-0211 Phone: 585.273.5481 Fax: 585.275.2070 E-Mail: riul@mail.rochester.edu http://www.rochester.edu/College/BIO/faculty/Iuli |
Subject: theory base and Piaget Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2002 10:26:23 -0700 From: Anton Lawson <anton1@asu.edu> To: narst-l@narst.org Dear List Serve Members, I would like to thank John, Dewey, Richard, Ron and others for their remarks concerning my previous message concerning the theoretical and empirical basis for inquiry science. Their comments were, I believe, right on target. I too am very concerned about educational fads and have worked to help the science education community develop a sound basis for educational practice. I strongly believe that we now have that basis - a much needed basis to inoculate us against the next fad that happens along. Of course, as stated, part of sustaining this effort is to be very careful about building on past progress (including both Piagetian and Ausubelian theory), rather than tossing the helpful parts away and starting from scratch. Having said this, allow me to offer an example. As stated previously, I believe Piaget's concept of equilibration lies at the heart of the current constructivist movement and even at the heart of the current interest in and importance of conceptual change research with its focus on one finds it based on embryological and evolutionary analogies, not on neural physiology. Of course this is a weakness in Piagetian theory. But it does not mean that the theory is wrong. It just means that it is incomplete. In fact, when modern neurological concepts are incorporated, one finds that they compliment Piaget's thinking very well. Also it should be noted that more recent research in brain growth shows that brains do grow in spurts and plateaus that correspond remarkably well with Piaget's stages. Of course this does not necessarily mean that intellectual development occurs in spurts and plateaus. But it does offer some support for the theory. I have written a book, soon to be published by Kluwer, that discusses all of this in hopes of solidifying, updating, and expanding our much needed theoretical and empirical basis for inquiry science. Lastly, I agree with John Staver that teaching by inquiry essentially means teaching by use of learning cycles. Sincerely, Anton E. Lawson, Professor Department of Biology Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 85287-1501 USA Phone: 480-965-2540 FAX: 480-956-2519 E-mail: anton.lawson@asu.edu |
Subject: one more comment Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2002 12:29:41 -0700 From: Anton Lawson <anton1@asu.edu> To: narst-l@narst.org Dear List Serve Members, Please allow me one more comment. Given that constructivism is currently so popular in educational circles and that its origin may be somewhat in doubt, the following exchange between J. Piaget and J. C. Bringuier might be of interest: Bringuier: In fact, there's a single word for the whole of your work - a word I once heard you use; it's "constructivism." Piaget: Yes, that's exactly right. Knowledge is neither a copy of the object nor taking consciousness of a priori forms predetermined in the subject; it's a perpetual construction made by exchanges between the organism and the environment, from the biological point of view, and between thought and its object, from the cognitive point of view. In J.C. Bringuier (1980, p. 110) Conversations with Jean Piaget. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Anton E. Lawson, Professor Department of Biology Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 85287-1501 USA Phone: 480-965-2540 FAX: 480-956-2519 |
Subject: Science, Theory and Science Education Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2002 14:39:37 -0700 From: David Geelan <dgeelan@ualberta.ca> Organization: University of Alberta To: narst-l@narst.org Hi All I've really enjoyed the discussion on the list over the past few days, around the theory base for research and practice in science education. As Ron Good noted, while it's great to see the job advertisements passing through (and great that there are so many opportunities for beginning science educators), it's also nice to have some discussion of substantive science education and research issues in the list. Like Anton, John, Dewey, Richard and Ron, I value the legacy of Piaget, constructivist views about genetic epistemology, and the concepts of accommodation, assimilation and equilibration. I do believe that they offer one very important referent for thinking about students' learning in all subjects, but particularly in science, and about the ways we conduct research into that learning and the teaching practices associated with it. I'm not sure this is what the authors intended, but I did catch a sense from some of the posts that Piaget (and neo-Piagetian approaches) is in some sense the 'best' and 'most scientific' theory base that we have available. The discussion, and Shirley Magnusson's original comment that sparked it, are in the context of the current US government's very strong push for only 'scientifically based' research to be valued and funded in education. I worry that by choosing to dub Piagetian theory as our 'best' scientifically based theoretical scheme in science education, we might be buying in to this mindset that really only values large scale, quantitative, 'predict and control' types of research. Please note that I'm not characterising Piaget's work (or the huge body of research that has grown out of it) in that way - Piaget was a pioneer of qualitative and interview methodologies in research on cognition. What makes my spider-sense tingle a bit is the return of 'grand theory' - a single, all-embracing scheme within which work is expected to be conducted, and where work that does not fall within that scheme is not supported or valued. Constructivist epistemology, and the descriptions and prescriptions of teaching that arise out of it, is one important plank of the theory base of science education, but in my opinion it would be very dangerous to make it the only one. Research like that of Jean Clandinin and Michael Connelly (1996, 2000) in narrative modes of rationality, Jack Whitehead (1989, 1998) in teachers' research into their own practices, Max van Manen's (1990, 1991) phenomenological work and Frederick Steier's (1995) work on reflexivity all have the potential to enrich our understanding of the complex environments in classrooms, but are in danger in the present discussion of being swept aside as 'fads', irrelevant to the 'main game' of Piagetian constructivist research. (I attempted to sketch some 'postmodern alternatives' to (Piagetian) conceptual change theories of student learning in this paper: http://unr.edu/homepage/crowther/ejse/geelan.html ) In particular, action research and other practitioner research in single classrooms is enormously valuable, but appears nowhere on the radar of grand theory approaches. The problem with the notion of 'scientific' theories in science education is that (like the discipline of academic psychology (see Polkinghorne, 1992)), there is always the danger that 'scientific' is limited to models that slavishly follow analogies from the physical sciences, rather than using methods and approaches from the human sciences. Jurgen Habermas' (1971) three 'human interests' - the technical (modeled from physical science), practical (human science) and emancipatory/critical (politics and freedom) - are a very important reminder that in order to deal with the rich complexity of lifeworlds - including those of teachers and students in schools - it is important to draw on the best tools available, from a variety of disciplines. The current calls for 'scientific' theories in education draw exclusively on Habermas' 'technical' interest - theories that can reliably (if not infallibly) predict and control results, and give clear relationships of cause and effect. While affirming the value of the on-going search for understandings of the relationship of certain actions on the part of teachers (and of society more broadly) to the learning of students, I think it is a fatal error to seek all the answers for the human science realm of education without using the appropriate methods and research approaches from the 'practical' interest. I could be wrong, but I don't think any of the people who have written in support of Piagetian theory were advocating a purge of other theoretical bases - they were responding to Shirley's perceived dismissal of Piaget as a valuable theoretical base. But I think defending the *diversity* of our blend of theoretical perspectives is especially crucial when that richness and diversity is under threat from a government that has a particular very clear agenda about removing diversity. Without buying into the political sphere (too late!), I think that the demand for 'scientific' theories in education is intended to move the debate into very tightly controlled spheres of central planning, 'accountability' that is defined in terms of scores on standardised tests, and greater prediction and control of behaviour (of both teachers and students). I think it's very valuable to affirm the value of Piaget and constructivist theory, but very dangerous to buy in to the logic of 'scientific' (in a narrow, technical rationalist sense) theories of science learning and teaching. Warm regards, David Geelan REFERENCES Clandinin, D.J. & Connelly, F.M. (2000). Narrative inquiry: Experience and story in qualitative research. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Clandinin, D.J. & Connelly, F.M. (1996). Teachers professional knowledge landscapes: Teacher stories stories of teachers school stories stories of schools. Educational Researcher, 25(3). (pp. 24-30) Habermas, J. (1971). Knowledge and human interests. Translated by J.J. Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press. Polkinghorne, D.E. (1992). Postmodern epistemology of practice. In S. Kvale (Ed.), Psychology and Postmodernism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Steier, F. (1995). From universing to conversing: An ecological constructivist approach to learning and multiple description. In L.P. Steffe and J. Gale (Eds.), Constructivism in education, (pp. 67-84). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Van Manen, M. (1991). The tact of teaching: The meaning of pedagogical thoughtfulness. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Van Manen, M. (1990). Researching lived experience: Human science for an action-sensitive pedagogy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Whitehead, A.J. (1998). Developing research-based professionalism through living educational theories. Address to the Educational Studies Association of Ireland at Trinity College, Dublin, 27 November 1998. http://www.bath.ac.uk/~edsajw/writing2.html Whitehead, A.J. (1989). Creating a living educational theory from questions of the kind, "How do I improve my practice?". Cambridge Journal of Education, 19(1), 41-52.-- David R. Geelan, PhD Department of Secondary Education 341 Education South University of Alberta Edmonton AB, Canada T6G 2G5 Ph. (780)492-5671, Fax (780)492-9402 http://bravus.port5.com E-mail: david.geelan@ualberta.ca |
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Subject: theory-based science education Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 23:31:45 +1100 From: Michael Matthews <michaelmatt@optusnet.com.au> To: narst-l@narst.org Dear NARST colleagues, |
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Subject: Re: theory-based science education Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 09:08:26 -0500 From: "Steven W. Gilbert" <swgilbert@vt.edu> To: Michael Matthews <michaelmatt@optusnet.com.au>, narst-l@narst.org I am not sure I completely agree with Michael on this, but, then, it
might be desirable to distinguish learning theory from broader educational
theory. If we narrowly define the former as theories of how people learn
across settings, the latter might be construed as as addressing what people
learn in a formal setting, and why they should and do learn it. That is,
educational theory might be thought of as what it is important for the
individual to learn formally in the personal, cultural, social contexts
and career ambitions of the learner. Sustained and developed educational
theories are as important as learning theories, since they provide the
framework for the curriculum of the schools;and such theory definitely
deal with what it is important to learn: what is the best way to prepare
students in science for life at each grade level? How should curriculum
be organized? |
Subject: learning theory and the "truth" Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 09:18:34 -0700 From: Anton Lawson <anton1@asu.edu> To: narst-l@narst.org Dear List Serve Members, Sorry but I could not help responding to Michael Matthews. While Michael makes many good points, I for one do not think that the prior conversation should be construed as narrowly as Michael appears to have done with respect to "learning" theories. Certainly the theory that I have in mind is deeply rooted in epistemology/history/philosophy/psychology (and even neural physiology), and it most certainly involves decision making about what should be taught (as well as how it should be taught). To keep it brief but to provide an example, consider evolution and special creation. The educational theory that I have in mind implies that both of these "alternative" theories should be introduced (among others). Students should then be asked to explore/generate the predictions that follow from each. Next they should consider the evidence and how well it matches or fails to match the alternative predictions. Only then should they be encouraged to come to a decision about which theory is the "truth" (read better explanation for present-day species diversity) based on the match/mismatch of predictions with evidence. One could argue that such an instructional approach should have four happy consequences: 1) students should develop better reasoning/argumentative skills, 2) they should learn the "concepts" embedded in the theories (and of course the theories), 3) they should develop a better understanding of how science works and its strengths/limitations(NOS), and 4) they should gain confidence in their ability to do science. Keep the arrows flying! Sincerely, Anton E. Lawson, Professor Department of Biology Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 85287-1501 USA |
Greetings to all, |
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Subject: theory-based science education Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 12:24:37 -0600 From: Joanne K Olson <jkolson@iastate.edu> To: narst-l@narst.org Dear NARST colleagues, It's time for me to respond to Michael Matthews' perspectives regarding the role of learning theories in science education decision making. I agree with Tony Lawson that Matthews makes many fine points. While learning theories describe how people learn, no matter the "acceptedness" of the concept being learned, they do, in fact, deeply influence the teaching process. As Steven Gilbert points out, teachers do make decisions based on epistemological perspectives. Teachers need to understand learning theories, not for merely academic reasons, but because they do have implications for the pedagogy that is employed in a classroom. This is not to say that teachers who possess sophisticated understandings of learning theory automatically make informed classroom decisions, but more informed decisions can be made. Critical here is the understanding of the role of the teacher in the classroom. One of Shulman's categories included pedagogical knowledge. Such knowledge requires a theory base, of which learning theory is an important part. Colton & Sparks-Langer (1993) address this issue quite well. While I agree with Gilbert that effective teachers may not be able to articulate learning theories, educators are certainly more credible in this political environment (and when working with student teachers) when they can articulate why they do what they do. What we do in the classroom should be informed by how people learn, assuming that learning is what we're after! That's my penny's worth from the cornfields! Joanne ************************************** |
Subject: Re: learning theory and the "truth" Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 17:00:54 -0500 From: "Mike U. Smith" <SMITH_MU@Mercer.EDU> Reply-To: SMITH_MU@Mercer.EDU Organization: o=Mercer University To: Anton Lawson <anton1@asu.edu> CC: narst-l@narst.org Well folks, I tried to keep out of this one, but after Tony’s last posting, I found it impossible to do so. Although I realize that his posting uses evolution/ creationism only as an example and is not as the central point being made (and I CERTAINLY DO NOT want to start another useless evolution-creation debate here), I feel so strongly against what he is proposing that I must respond. (I will leave Michael to respond to the general argument Tony is making, though I do disagree as well with Tony that science tells us what "should be taught"--except of course that we should teach science and not non-science.) Tony proposes having science students “consider evolution and special creation” as “"alternative" theories. . . Students should then be asked to explore/ generate the predictions that follow from each. Next they should consider the evidence and how well it matches or fails to match the alternative predictions.” Perhaps my rationale for opposing such teaching is best summarized in the following quotation: “First and foremost, special creation and evolution are not alternative scientific hypotheses or competing scientific theories. Encouraging students to choose between the two therefore has a substantial potential to confuse both the understanding of the nature of evolution and the nature of science and scientific evidence. If the validity of competing scientific and non-scientific positions is to be determined in this way, the students might just as well vote on whether the germ theory or demonic possession is the more acceptable “alternative hypothesis” for the cause of infectious disease. The issue is not what students decide is right, but what counts as science.” Smith MU, Siegel H, and McInerney, JD. (1995). Foundational Issues in Evolution Education. Science Education 4:23-46. In simplest terms, debating evolution vs. creationism gives too much away. It inappropriately gives apparent scientific status to creationism and thus has the potential to confuse students about the nature of scientific theories and of science itself. Secondly, Tony’s teaching activity asks students to “consider the evidence” for each, but there can, of course, be no empirical evidence for the claim that a supernatural being created living things. Again, therefore, students will be confused about what we mean by a crucial scientific term—this time, the term “evidence.” Therefore, I feel that the potential of encouraging such classroom debate for causing substantial confusion about the nature of science is simply too high and such teaching should be avoided. And that is my two cents worth! Thanks for listening. -- Mike U. Smith, Ph.D. Director of AIDS Education and Research Professor of Medical Education Department of Internal Medicine Mercer University School of Medicine 707 Pine Street Macon, GA 31207 |
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| Subject: Re: theory-based science education Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 17:25:21 -0500 From: Shirley Magnusson <smag@umich.edu> To: narst-l@narst.org Dear Colleagues, What a pleasure to see the thoughtful messages about the important question of the theory base in science education. Thanks should go to Tony Lawson for starting the conversation in that direction, as my original posting raised a question about the research base in science education, by which I meant the empirical base. Of course, questions of theory are (or should be) at the root of the empirical base, and I think that Tony's response in that direction speaks to the central role that theory plays in his own thinking -- something that has always been evident in his work and is a great strength. I hope this important exchange of ideas continues on the list with additional thoughtful responses that provide opportunities for us all to reflect upon the ideas guiding our individual work and work in the field of science education in general. Toward that end, I would like to pose additional questions for consideration. Ron Good made some important points in his message that I want to return to. I would like to frame them as questions. (1) Since Piaget contributed both epistemological as well as theoretical ideas about learning, to what extent are claims about the Piagetian basis for the field or specific approaches to instruction about the value and validity of his epistemological views versus his theoretical views? (2) Considering the evidence of the domain-specificity of learning, how does one interpret Piagetian theory that represents cognitive structures as domain general? I'm glad to know of Tony's book, and perhaps he addresses these issues. In addition, I thought some of you might be unaware of and might be interested in knowing about work in a different field that has bearing on these questions, including influencing Piaget himself regarding the applicability of some of his ideas. In a 1995 paper by Barbara Rogoff and Pablo Chavajay, they note that "when scholars began examining Piagetian tasks in other cultures, theyfound that culture was related to Piagetian concepts in ways that led Piaget to revise his stance on the generality of the formal operational stage and led to interest in understanding the role of familiarity (emphasis added) in concrete operational thinking." (p. 860) A 1972 paper of Piaget's is cited in which he is described as concluding that the "achievement of formal operations was tied to people's experience with the specific kind of scientific thinking that this stage focused on (such as in high school science classes) rather than being culture free and domain free." (Ibid) Piaget, J. (1972). Intellectual evolution from adolescence to adulthood. Human Development, 15, 1-12. Rogoff, B. & Chavajay, P. (1995). What's become of research on the cultural basis of cognitive development? American Psychologist, 50(10), 859-877. For me, the Rogoff and Chavajay paper, which traces the history of development of research on cognition and culture from a cross-cultural perspective [and provides information about a number of studies in which apects of Piagetian theory were examined with cultures around the world], is an important reminder of an important distinction between research in the natural and social sciences: the importance of context. In the natural sciences, relationships are expected to hold regardless of context; in the social sciences, the nature of the context is the key to understanding what occurs. David Geelan wrote about this type of issue much more elegantly (and knowledgeably) than I could, and I appreciated the reminder about the additional issues that he raised. Even so, I want to return to the original question I raised about the research basis for inquiry-based instruction. My parenthetical comment about theory was meant to indicate my sense that there was an absence of specification of the theory base in studies in the field these days (in this country). There used to be many studies that explicitly examined the implications of Piagetian theory for science teaching and learning. Now they are rare. I took that to mean that the theory had been abandoned by the field. It seems that several community members think otherwise. My questions then are: (3) what does the community see as its theory base at this point in time (and that is not meant to suggest the need for a single or "grand" theory). (4) given a particular theory base that is pertinent to issues of instruction, what is the empirical base regarding its application in the context of inquiry-based instruction? The Learning Cycle has been proposed as the approach to use for inquiry-based instruction. However, there are several versions of the Learning Cycle, some of which would appear to have contradictory phases: whether students invent concepts or teachers introduce them. In the former version, which I think is more representative of how the Learning Cycle is thought about, the cultural basis of the production of scientific knowledge raises the question of how students are expected to generate or invent the targeted scientific knowledge. It does not seem that the Learning Cycle specifies the cultural conditions that would seem to be necessary to ensure that students will develop the targeted knowledge/reasoning. (5) Do others agree? What other ways do members think about this issue? I raise these questions not to criticize the idea of a learning cycle approach, but to suggest that our knowledge has grown beyond Karplus' initial ideas, and it would seem important to advance our learning cycle models to incorporate that additional knowledge. Perhaps that is what John Staver intended to indicate by mentioning the BSCS 5E model. However, if we're now talking about utilizing the 5E model, that again raises the question of its empirical basis. To what extent do we have empirical evidence for learning benefits of the 5E model over the three-cycle approach of Karplus or Renner's learning cycles? Are all five phases necessary; that is, have studies been conducted that examined whether similar results could be obtained with fewer phases? Has the 5E model been compared to other approaches that have the same learning goals? As many of you know, Ken Tobin, Deborah Tippins, and Alejandro Gallard were authors of a chapter in the Handbook for Research on Science Teaching that included a review of studies of the learning cycle [there is also mention of . There are two features of that section of the chapter that I think are pertinent to this conversation: * early studies of the learning cycle looked at the extent to which all the phases were necessary and whether the order was important [so shouldn't the same thing be examined relative to the additional phases of the 5E model?] * a later study that compared the learning-cycle approach to a systematic-modeling approach (not modeling as in scientific modeling of the world, but modeling as in teacher modeling of desired thinking and action) found that the systematic modeling approach was more effective in "leading to improvements in achievement and formal reasoning." (p. 77) [how do we account for this result?] Furthermore, I am struck by the lack of specification about what happens in the phase of the learning cycle that would seem to result in it being learning via inquiry: the concept invention phase. In fact, in the original Karplus model, it appears that this phase is not invention, but concept introduction (by the teacher), which is quite different. Osborne and Freyberg (1985) presented a nice comparison of teaching sequences (pp. 101-105) that compared Renner and Karplus versions of the learning cycle to two other models (by Nussbaum and Novick, and Erickson) that more explicitly indicated (in the titles of their phases) aspects that connect them to Piagetian theory: the intent to provoke disequilibrium and accommodation (assuming the presence of alternative views) to a new concept. I wonder to what extent empirical studies of the learning cycle determined which version was being utilized, and whether there was fidelity to the critical aspect of provoking disequilibrium. Furthermore, how many studies involved a comparison of student learning outcomes from a learning cycle approach versus other inquiry-oriented approaches? Again, the intent here is not to criticize views about the viability of a learning cycle approach, but to question to what extent we have engaged in research (or theory-building) that provides very specific information about what works and why. It would seem to me that the probability of provoking disequilibrium is greatly facilitated by providing particular kinds of experiences for students (isn't this the origin of the notion of discrepant events)? If so, then there is a curriculum component that is at play as well as an instructional one. I wonder if that is part of the issue that Steve Gilbert was raising. In addition to learning theories there are theories of curriculum, theories of instruction, theories of schooling, etc. How do ideas from these various dimensions intersect and interact? How do we build general knowledge in the field of science education when there are all these different aspects that impinge upon learning? Finally, I want to return to an important comment made by Ellice Forman in relation to David Geelan's posting. She characterized his suggestion as a call to think more broadly about our research paradigms. And I will be so bold as to suggest that her use of the plural form of paradigm indicated her expectation that several paradigms would be the norm in a field. If I'm accurate about that, then in this she echos a view Shulman (1986) wrote about in his chapter in the 3rd edition of the Handbook of Research on Teaching entitled "Paradigms and Research Programs in the Study of Teaching." Shulman wrote of Kuhn's influence in leading scholars to think of the role of paradigms in guiding the activity of research communities. Whereas Kuhn described a mature science as being a case where one paradigm is dominant at a time, Shulman indicated agreement with Merton's view (for the field of sociology) of "the superiority of a set of competing paradigms over the hegemony of a single school of thought." (p. 5). Thus, the argument is that in the social sciences, a mature science is indicated by the presence of multiple research paradigms, some of which may be competing. Shulman even quotes Feyerabend (1974) as being in support of this view as indicated by an essay entitled "How to be a good empiricist: A plea for tolerance in matters epistemological" "You can be a good empiricist only if you are prepared to work with many alternative theories rather than with a single point of view and 'experience.' This plurality of theories must not be regarded as a preliminary stage of knowledge which will at some time in the future be replaced by the One True Theory." What is the view of this community regarding multiple research paradigms? Do folks agree with Shulman, Merton, Feyerabend, and several folks who have posted messages indicating this view? If so, where does that leave us in developing as a field? In responding to the current climate of SBR? Respectfully, Shirley |
Subject: inquiry and creationism Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 16:04:33 -0700 From: Anton Lawson <anton1@asu.edu> To: narst-l@narst.org Dear List Serve Members, I suppose that I should not have used evolution and special creation as an instructional example. The context never fails to bring out emotional responses. Nevertheless with regard to Mike Smith's comments, I suppose it depends on how you define the term theory. I define a theory as an explanation for a broad class of related phenomena - regardless of the amount and kind of evidence in its favor - or evidence that may be contradictory. In as much as special creation attempts to explain present-day species diversity (i.e., What caused the diversity of present-day life forms? Answer: God did it.), special creation qualifies as a theory. Anyone interested in details about how to pit evolution and special creation theories against one another as suggested in my prior posting can find them in Lawson, (1999) A scientific approach to teaching about evolution & special creation. The American Biology Teacher, 61(4), 266-274. I wonder if anyone (Mike?) would object to an inquiry teaching approach if described in the following way/context: To keep it brief but to provide an example, consider a pendulum's weight and the length of its string and their possible effect on the pendulum's period. The educational theory that I have in mind implies that both of these "alternative" hypotheses should be introduced (among others). Students should then be asked to explore/generate the predictions that follow from each (e.g., If...the period depends on the weight, and we vary the weight on two pendulums and keep other variables constant, then...the two pendulums should swing at different speeds (prediction). Alternatively, if the period depends on the length of string, then...the two pendulums should swing at the same speeds (alternative prediction)). Next they should consider the evidence and how well it matches or fails to match the alternative predictions (e.g., the two pendulums with different weights swing at the same speed. This is a result that does not match the predicted result based on the weight hypothesis and the test). Only then should they be encouraged to come to a decision about which hypothesis is the "truth" (read better explanation for differences in pendulum swing speeds) based on the match/mismatch of predictions with evidence (the weight hypothesis is not supported). Note; causal hypotheses, such as those mentioned above, and theories do not differ in kind (both are explanatory). Rather they differ in degree - theories being more complex, more general and more abstract. But I would argue that the instructional approach to both is essentially the same. The key point being that instruction should not ignore ideas that students bring to the classroom. Sincerely, Tony Anton E. Lawson, Professor Department of Biology Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 85287-1501 USA |
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